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REGULATORY COMPETITION OR REGULATORY
HARMONIZATION? A SILLY QUESTION?
Alan 0. Sykes*
ABSTRACT
The debate over 'competition versus harmonization' in regulatory policy often
confuses the pertinent alternatives. This comment argues that neither pure
regulatory competition nor complete regulatory harmonization is desirable or
feasible where important international cross-border effects of regulation arise.
Instead, a considerable degree of cooperation is almost always needed, yet
non-homogeneity of regulatory policies is almost always desirable as well.
This proposition holds virtually regardless of the subject matter of regulation.
Is regulatory harmonization desirable or should we instead prefer regulatory
competition? This question is being asked regularly today in a wide array of
regulatory contexts, at the global, regional, and national levels. In this brief
comment, I wish to suggest that this question is, at best, confusing. The
proper question is to what extent should regulators cooperate with regulators in
other jurisdictions? And to that question, the proper answer is that when regula-
tion affects actors outside of the regulating jurisdiction, some degree of regu-
latory cooperation is almost always valuable, at least to the extent of defining
the circumstances under which regulatory deference will occur, and prohibit-
ing regulators from engaging in certain behaviors that are the product of
domestic rent-seeking. The harder question is whether cooperation on ulti-
mate regulatory goals or targets is beneficial, and here the answer is highly
context specific. It is very much the exceptional case, however, where
cooperation should proceed to the point of complete harmonization or
'homogenization' of regulatory policies across all jurisdictions.
1. LEVELS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
At the outset, it is useful to distinguish several types of regulatory competition
and cooperation. They involve varying degrees of intrusion into the autonomy
of regulators, and span the options from complete local autonomy under pure
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regulatory competition to the complete elimination of autonomy through
regulatory homogenization. The line between these categories can be fuzzy at
times to be sure, but they nevertheless serve as useful tools for organizing the
subsequent discussion.
Pure regulatory competition
The classic economic papers on local public goods and decentralized regula-
tion, such as those of Tiebout' and Oates and Schwab,2 envision a strictly
noncooperative regulatory environment. Local governments choose the level
of public services, or of regulation, taking the policies of other jurisdictions
as given. Although other forms of strategic interaction between regulators
have been studied,3 regulators in this literature make no legal commitments
to each other and at most set their regulatory policies with an eye toward the
expected strategic reaction of foreign regulators. Such conditions may be
termed pure regulatory competition.
Mutual deference or recognition agreements
Regulators often wish to assert some jurisdiction over foreign practices that
have an effect in their own territory. To ameliorate the conflicts that may
result, regulators may agree on principles of deference to foreign regulation.
In some instances, a simple choice of law rule can suffice - regulators can
covenant that particular actors or transactions will be subject to the law of
one jurisdiction over another under specified circumstances. Related, regu-
lators may agree to afford mutual recognition to foreign regulation under
specified conditions, so that actors complying with the regulations of one
jurisdiction will be deemed in compliance with the rules in another jurisdic-
tion.
Minimal or essential requirements agreements
At times regulators may find it valuable to agree on certain minimum stand-
ards that their regulatory policies must meet. They might agree that securities
laws must include some form of anti-fraud rules, for example, or that product
safety regulations must achieve a minimal degree of safety with regard to a
particular class of accidents. Such agreements set a floor on the stringency
of regulation, roughly speaking, leaving regulators free to regulate more
stringently.
Charles M. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures', 64 J Pol Econ 416 (1956).
2 Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, 'Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing', 35 J Pub Econ 333 (1988).
See the paper by Ricky Revesz in this issue, and sources cited therein.
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Regulatory forbearance agreements
Regulators may also agree to limit their freedom to regulate in various
respects, such as to reduce the adverse impact of regulation on foreign com-
merce. Agreements of this sort might prohibit discrimination against foreign
commerce, require that regulators employ the 'least restrictive means' to
achieve their goals, and so on. Here, the emphasis is on what regulators must
not do, while still preserving their ability to choose their regulatory targets.
Agreement on non-homogeneous regulatory targets
At times regulators may agree on the substantive targets of their regulations.
These targets might include the permissible level of emissions of a particular
pollutant in each jurisdiction, for example, or the reserve requirements for
particular types of insurers in each jurisdiction. Such agreements need not set
the same target everywhere, but may allow for differences in policy due to a
variety of factors.
Agreement on uniform regulatory targets
In the limit, regulators might agree that rules must be the same everywhere
in all of their particulars. These agreements can extend not only to substantive
regulatory targets, but also to the manner by which regulators ensure compli-
ance with their regulations (commonly called 'conformity assessment').
2. OPTIMAL COOPERATION
In the regulatory matters of interest to international economic law scholars,
and to the authors of papers in this conference, cross-border issues abound.
Securities regulators must decide whether to apply their laws to foreign firms
and transactions; banking regulators must decide whether to apply their
licensing and prudential standards to foreign banks; labor organizations pro-
pose to extend labor standards to developing countries; environmental regu-
lators must address matters that involve cross-border pollution or harm to the
global commons.
In all of these areas, a case can be made for a considerable degree of 'regu-
latory competition'. One or more of the standard arguments apply: (a) Condi-
tions differ across jurisdictions (tastes, incomes, etc.), and hence there is no
reason to think that an optimal regulatory policy for one jurisdiction will be
optimal for another. (b) As a slight variant, conditions differ among the actors
that are subject to regulation. What is optimal for one pair of transactors, for
example, may not be optimal for another, and regulatory competition may
allow them to pick the regime that maximizes their welfare. (c) The optimal
regulatory policy is unknown, and regulatory competition will allow experi-
mentation that reveals information about what is optimal. (d) Regulation is
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subject to capture and rent-seeking that leads it toward suboptimality, and
such wasteful regulation can be disciplined by capital movements under regu-
latory competition. This list is not necessarily exhaustive.
To say that 'regulatory competition' is desirable, however, is not to say that
regulatory cooperation is undesirable. Consider securities law as an illustra-
tion. A number of scholars have argued powerfully for regulatory competition
in this area, contending that firms and their investors should be allowed to
choose the system of securities regulation that they feel will maximize the
value of the firm. Because there are no obvious externalities to the investment
contract, and because sophisticated investors will arguably protect the
unsophisticated, the argument for freedom of contract over the applicable
regulatory regime is indeed compelling.
Can this form of freedom of contract emerge in an entirely noncooperative
environment, one of pure regulatory competition? The answer is almost cer-
tainly no. For part of pure regulatory competition, by definition, is non-
cooperative decisions regarding such matters as choice of law when a dispute
arises in a domestic court between domestic citizens and foreign citizens. If
firms and investors are to be allowed to choose the applicable regulation, and
investment crosses borders (as it surely does in practice), then every nation
must adopt a choice of law rule that honors the regulatory choice made by
the parties to the original investment contract, and further honors the results
of dispute resolution that may well take place abroad. It seems exceedingly
unlikely that all jurisdictions will arrive at this rule noncooperatively (to my
knowledge, not one has arrived at it yet). Thus, even in this area where the
case for regulatory competition is especially powerful, a formal agreement to
defer to foreign regulation when selected by firms and investors will likely be
required.
Agreement on such a rule may be exceedingly difficult, as many regulators
will fear a loss of influence should firms and investors choose to take their
regulatory business elsewhere. But even high-minded regulators interested
only in the welfare of their citizens may resist agreeing to respect firms' and
investors' choice of regulation if they view that choice as fundamentally inad-
equate to achieve the basic goals of their domestic regulation. If a corporation
and its investors appear to have chosen a regulation that affords no protection
to the investors against corporate fraud, for example, regulators may see the
choice as so obviously flawed that it should not be respected. More precisely,
the absence of some regulatory principle widely perceived as essential will
signal to many that freedom of contract has gone awry; and whether or not
this perception is accurate, the political pressures to deviate from any promise
of deference can become enormous.
Hence, if an agreement to defer to foreign regulation when firms and
investors choose it is to be sustainable, it will likely have to do one of two
things. Either it will have to enumerate the specific national regulatory
systems that are deemed worthy of deference, or it will have to specify the
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properties that any regulatory system must have (such as basic anti-fraud
protection) in order to be eligible for deference. Implicitly or explicitly, there-
fore, an indispensable part of any agreement to defer to foreign regulation is
likely to be a proviso that the foreign regulation in question must contain
certain minimal substantive rules, along with some minimal process to make
them enforceable.
Summarizing to this point, I have argued that even in the securities area
where the case for regulatory competition is perhaps as powerful as anywhere,
the benefits of regulatory competition probably cannot be achieved without
formal agreements on mutual deference and on the minimal substantive and
procedural requirements that each regulatory system covered by the agree-
ment must satisfy. But even more may well be required. Imagine, for example,
that the securities laws of some country systematically disfavored foreign par-
ties to a dispute through some substantive or procedural rule that had the
effect of discriminating in favor of domestic nationals. It seems exceedingly
unlikely that such discrimination could be efficient, and equally unlikely that
government officials abroad would be willing to respect the outcome of dis-
pute resolution under such a law as a political matter.
Accordingly, to sustain the mutual deference that is necessary to secure the
benefits of regulatory competition, it will likely also be necessary to agree
on certain things that regulation may not do (such as discriminate against
foreigners). And because facially nondiscriminatory policies can have a dis-
parate impact under some conditions (imagine a rule that required all firms
to be audited by a particular set of auditors who cannot read documents in a
foreign language, for example), the rules necessary to prevent discrimination
may need to be rather elaborate, extending to least restrictive means require-
ments, transparency requirements, and the like.
Putting it all more succinctly, I suspect that to secure the benefits of regu-
latory competition over securities law, a formal international agreement
rivaling some of the WTO agreements in detail and complexity might well be
necessary. The alternative would be a series of bilateral negotiations over
mutual deference that would implicitly check whether the rules that an in-
depth agreement would embody are satisfied by both parties. Whether one
believes that such agreements are normatively necessary perhaps depends on
one's prior beliefs about the ability of investors to take care of themselves.
But their necessity as political matter seems much more obvious - regulators
cannot be expected to defer to foreign regulation that is seen as profoundly
inadequate to protect their domestic constituencies.
Although I have developed this argument using the example of securities
laws, the point is much more general. For almost any sort of regulation that
touches international trade or investment, regulatory competition is likely to
produce regulatory conflict. Cooperative agreements to address the unpro-
ductive consequences of that conflict will be valuable. Banking regulators (or
their political superiors) can cooperate on establishing minimal prudential
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standards in support of mutual recognition, so that international banks do
not become subject to inconsistent or redundant national regulatory require-
ments. Environmental regulators can cooperate so that legitimate environ-
mental objectives are not pursued through means that raise the relative costs
of foreigners and achieve protectionism. Prescription drug regulators can
cooperate to facilitate reliance on drug testing done abroad, and so on.
Of course, much of this cooperation already occurs - the Basel Accord in
the banking sector and the WTO technical barriers codes speak to the issues
just mentioned in considerable detail. But much valuable cooperation remains
to be undertaken. Antitrust regulators are under no general nondiscrimination
obligation presently, for example, so there is nothing in international law to
discipline domestic rent-seeking at the expense of global welfare (for example,
export cartels permitted under US law by the Webb Pomerene Act). WTO
negotiators have only begun to scratch the surface in reducing regulatory
impediments to services trade in many sectors. The potential for valuable
mutual recognition agreements regarding food and drug regulation is enorm-
ous.
To this point, I have focused on the first three types of cooperation noted
in Section 1: mutual deference agreements, minimal requirements agree-
ments, and regulatory forbearance agreements. Some mix of these devices is
likely to be valuable in almost any imaginable area of regulation that has
cross-border effects. But when should cooperation proceed further, either to
the point of cooperation on non-homogeneous regulatory targets, or to the
point of complete regulatory harmonization?
My answer to this question will seem entirely old hat, at least to economists.
Cooperation on ultimate regulatory targets is likely to be useful when a tend-
ency toward underregulation arises because of cross-border non-pecuniary
externalities. The United States has little incentive to put an end to the acid
rain that it is causing to fall in Canada, for example, and vice versa, absent
reciprocal promises to curtail it to specified levels. The problems caused by
the discharge of greenhouse gases and chloroflourocarbons into the global
commons raise serious free rider concerns that likely require agreement on
emission levels if a solution is to be found.
Of course, to say that the opportunity for valuable cooperation arises here is
not to say that valuable cooperation will necessarily arise in practice. Political
impediments to a deal may prove insurmountable; any deal that is reached
may be highly imperfect and even make matters worse depending on the
interest group process involved. But in the absence of nonpecuniary cross-
border externalities, one can certainly doubt that cooperation on ultimate
regulatory targets will be necessary or productive. The skepticism of most
economists toward calls for international labor standards follows immediately
from this proposition.4
See generally Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert Hudec, Fair Trade and Harmonization Vol I: Economic
Analysis (MIT Press 1996).
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Even where cooperation on ultimate regulatory targets is valuable, however,
it will be the exceedingly rare case where those targets should be identical, at
least at the global level or the level of the large nation-state. Heterogeneous
incomes, cultures, risk preferences, and other tastes will generally justify het-
erogeneous regulatory targets as well.5
Exceptions may occasionally arise. On matters of technical compatibility
(railroad gauges, communications protocols for fax machines), for example,
where the issue involves a largely arbitrary choice among competing stand-
ards, a single choice for all markets can exploit all conceivable economies of
scale and avoid wasteful incompatibilities. And perhaps the occasional case
will arise where some substance is so harmful to the environment that it is
optimal to ban it everywhere (chloroflourocarbons?). But these are limited
classes of cases, and for the most part regulatory homogenization is undesir-
able.
None of this is to deny, however, that some degree of homogenization is
needed simply to exploit regulatory economies of scale. It would make little
sense for ambient air standards to vary block to block within a city, or for
water pollution standards to vary mile by mile along a river. But since most
of the debate about regulatory competition involves regulation that it already
occurring at a fairly high level of government (states of the Union; countries
of the EU or of the WTO), this complication need not seriously detain us.
In sum, the 'choice' between regulatory competition and regulatory har-
monization involves not a dichotomous choice in the usual sense, but a selec-
tion from a lengthy menu.6 When the cross-border effects of regulation are
important, the pure regulatory competition of economic theory, and the com-
plete regulatory harmonization that lies at the other end of the continuum,
are almost never sensible. Rather, some sort of legally constrained regulatory
competition will make sense in many areas, while a higher degree of collabora-
tion on regulatory targets may be called for when important cross-border
non-pecuniary externalities arise.
These propositions are to a significant degree supportive of those who favor
regulatory 'federalism' and who invoke 'subsidiarity' notions in favor of
decentralization. To the degree that regulation at a higher level of government
would be accompanied by regulatory homogenization, there are good reasons
to doubt its wisdom at least at the global level or the level of the large nation-
state (or regional confederation). And as modern experience suggests, the
required degree of cooperation can often be achieved by treaty or by constitu-
tional oversight depending on the context. Of course, nothing in principle
For a fuller treatment, see Alan 0. Sykes, 'The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in
International Goods and Services Markets', 2 J Int'l Econ L 49 (1999).
Other authors have made similar points in particular regulatory contexts. See Daniel C. Esty and
Damien Geradin, 'Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness: A Conceptual
Framework', 32 J World Trade 5 (1998).
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requires that regulation at a higher level of government entail homogenization
within the jurisdiction of that government. In that important sense, the map-
ping between the analysis here and the federalism/subsidiarity debate is
imperfect.
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